David Malament and the Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Reply by Grünbaum, Adolf
1To appear as a chapter in Volume I of 
Adolf Grünbaum, Philosophy of Science in Action,
to be published by Oxford University Press in New York.
David Malament and the Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Reply
Adolf Grünbaum
University of Pittsburgh
1. In his influential article Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of
Simultaneity, David Malament began his paper as follows:1
Adolf Grünbaum maintains that, within the framework of special
relativity, the relation of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer is
conventional rather than factual in character. His argument turns on two
assertions:
(1)  The relation is not uniquely definable in terms of the relation of causal
connectibility.
(2)  Temporal relations are non-conventional if and only if they are so
definable.
The second assertion constitutes a version of the causal theory of time.
And in a 1989 letter to Max Jammer, Malament explained that when he wrote that article, he
directed it exclusively against my own specific version of conventionalism.2
Malament then states his objection to the necessary condition in (2) qua version of the
causal theory of time (Malament 1977, p. 293):
So far as I know, criticism of Grünbaums argument has always focused
on (2). Michael Friedman [3], for example, sees no reason why we must adopt a
causal theory of time or, for that matter, any other reductionist analysis of
temporal relations. Even if (1) is true, he argues, it does not follow that there is no
fact to the matter whether two events are simultaneous relative to a particular
inertial observer.
I am entirely sympathetic with Friedmans scepticism concerning (2).
But Malaments own argument against (1), as he construes it, proceeds without reference
to the merits or demerits of the causal theory of time, since his concern is to refute (1) within the
framework of a causal theory of temporal order even while avoiding debate over
2conventionalism and causal theories of time (Ibid.). Therefore, to achieve expository clarity, I
shall defer to Section 6 my retort to Friedmans objection to the causal ontology of temporal
relations in the special theory of relativity.
Malaments argument is that he has demonstrated the unique definability denied by
assertion (1), so that the if clause in assertion (2) then entails the non-conventionality
(facticity) of the specified simultaneity relation, a conclusion he calls rather ironic (Malament
1977, p. 293). Alas, he does not give references to my writings to document his claim that I
committed myself to (1) and (2) in his particular sense of definability, which is predicated on
specified constraints. Indeed, I had not: As Allen Janis has importantly pointed out, one of these
constraints--the first of four--is genuinely problematic, and I had certainly not taken it for
granted, implicitly or otherwise, in my writings on the status of simultaneity in the inertial frames
of the special theory of relativity (STR).
In the causal context of the light cone structure of the STR, the facticity versus
conventionality of the relation of simultaneity relative to an inertial frame I turns on whether the
facts of causal connectibility and non-connectibility mandate (dictate) that relativized relation, on
the one hand, or whether these facts provide scope for alternative non-trivial stipulations in
constructing that relation, on the other. The issue raised by Malaments particular sense of
definability is thus whether the first of the constraints he imposes on the causal definability of
relative simultaneity is mandated by the pertinent causal facts or is non-trivially stronger than
what is thus mandated; furthermore, if that constraint is stronger, we shall need to determine the
bearing of dropping it on the unique definability of  relative simultaneity in terms of the relation
of causal connectibility.
2. Malament considers an inertial observer O, i.e., an observer at rest with respect to an
inertial frame I. To facilitate the statement of the four constraints he imposes on any causally
definable candidate for the relation of simultaneity with respect to O, he employs the following
definitions (1977, p. 297): (a) A causal automorphism is a one-to-one mapping of the space-
time onto itself which preserves the relation κ of causal connectibility among its event elements,
and (b) an O causal automorphism is a causal automorphism that maps the world line of O onto
itself. The four constraints he then imposes on any candidate S( p, q) for the relation of
simultaneity between two events p and q relative to O are the following:
3(i) S is invariant under all O causal automorphisms,
(ii) S is an equivalence relation,
(iii) There exist world points p and q, one of which is on Os world line while the other is
not, such that S( p, q),
(iv) S is not the universal relation.
Having imposed all four of these constraints, notably the first, Malament is able to prove that the
relative simultaneity relation of standard synchrony ∈=½ is uniquely definable from κ and O. He
denotes the latter relation by Sim0.
But before giving this proof, he declared: To be sure, there are other two-place relations
[of relative simultaneity] which are definable from κ and O [i.e., relative simultaneity relations
corresponding to non-standard synchrony, for example, some fixed ∈≠½]. But all these are ruled
out if minimal, seemingly innocuous conditions are imposed. One can agree at once that
constraints (iii) and (iv) are minimal and innocuous. But, as we shall see, what matters in the
context of the issue of the conventionality versus the facticity of relative simultaneity as
formulated above, is that the first of Malaments constraints is demonstrably not innocuous,
because it is not mandated by the facts of causal connectibility or non-connectibility.
Since his constraint (i) may therefore be dropped and be replaced by a different one or
another, I never took it for granted. And since Malaments sense of definability presupposes
(i), I did not, and do not now assert either assertions (1) or (2) in his sense of definability.
Therefore, his demonstration that assertion (1) is false as he construes definability does not tell
against my views. By the same token, in assertion (2), I do not subscribe to the if clause in his
sense of definability as a sufficient condition for the non-conventionality of temporal relations.
And yet Malament relies on just that if clause to deduce the non-conventionality of relative
simultaneity from the negation of (1). Precisely because his constraint (i) is not mandated by the
causal facts, and is thus replaceable, it will turn out that these facts allow a whole family of
relative simultaneity relations that are definable from κ and O, so that assertion (1) becomes true
rather than false as Malament would have it.
I shall use Allen Janiss scrutiny of Malaments constraint (i) to explain why I believe
that Malament has failed to discredit my ontological version of the claim that the conventionality
of relative simultaneity in the STR is a philosophically illuminating thesis. But it is expeditious
4and simpler to deal first with (ii), which asserts that S is an equivalence relation.
Let the clock of the inertial observer O assign a unique time coordinate t to every event
on Os world line. And let O also assign time coordinates to each event not on Os world line.
These assignments are to be governed by the following restriction: If a pair of distinct (i.e., non-
coinciding) events is causally connectible (by means of light in vacuo or by other causal chains),
they will be time-separated by being assigned different time coordinates; thus, the same time
coordinate will be assigned to distinct events only if they are not causally connectible, i.e., only if
they have a space-like separation, i.e., (in Hans Reichenbachs parlance) only if they are
topologically simultaneous.
As we know, the invariant relation of topological simultaneity (causal non-
connectibility) is not transitive and hence is not an equivalence relation: If an event E1 on Os
world line is topologically simultaneous with an event E′ not on that world line, and if E′, in turn,
is topologically simultaneous with an event E on Os world line but distinct from E1, then E1 and
E will not be topically simultaneous, since they both belong to Os world line, and are thus
causally connectible.
By the same token, the topological simultaneity of two distinct events is not sufficient for
their being assigned the same time coordinate t: If the topologically simultaneous pairs (E1, E′)
and (E′, E) were each assigned the same value of t, then Os clock would be assigning the same
time coordinate to both E1 and E on its own world line in violation of our restriction that causally
connectible events be time-separated.
But we shall say that two topologically simultaneous events are metrically
simultaneous with respect to O, if and only if Os clock does assign the same time coordinate to
them. And since the relation of numerical equality among time coordinates is an equivalence
relation, any relation of metrical simultaneity, as defined, will be an equivalence relation. Thus,
for any one value of Reichenbachs ∈(O<∈<1) that O uses to assign time coordinates to events
elsewhere from his clock--be it the value ∈=½ of standard synchrony or a value ∈≠½ in that
open interval corresponding to non-standard synchrony--the ensuing metrical simultaneity will be
an equivalence relation.
It is very important not to confuse the preceding assignment of time coordinates from one
and the same clock O to events not on Os world line, with the time coordinatization in the
5following different situation: Two separate observers A and B at rest in the same inertial frame
each assign time coordinates to events on the others world line using the same non-standard
synchrony ∈m≠½. In that case, once the B-clock is in such non-standard ∈m synchrony with the
A-clock, the A-clock will not be in ∈m synchrony with the B-clock, i.e., the same non-standard
synchrony is not symmetric as between separated clocks and hence is not an equivalence
relation.4  In other words, the B-clocks time coordinatization of events at the A-clock will
disagree with the A-clocks own time coordinatization of these events. Thus, in the case of non-
standard clock synchrony, if two spatially separated events are assigned the same time
coordinates by the A-clock--i.e., are metrically simultaneous from As point of view--they will
not be metrically simultaneous from Bs point of view.
Indeed, I have shown that if the same non-standard synchrony ∈m is used to synchronize a
clock B from a clock A, and a clock C from B, then the C-clock will not be in ∈m synchrony with
A.5  Thus, non-standard synchrony is intransitive rather than merely non-transitive. Hence such
synchrony fails in a further respect to be an equivalence relation. So much for Malaments
constraint (ii), demanding that S be an equivalence relation.
Before turning to Janiss scrutiny of constraint (i), several considerations are in order to
set the stage for it.
3. To articulate the sense in which I shall claim that, in the STR, the relevant physical
facts do not mandate a unique relation of relative simultaneity, let me explain carefully in just
what sense the pertinent physical facts postulated in Newtonian physics do mandate a unique and
indeed absolute relation of simultaneity between pairs of events. And I shall do so without appeal
to Newtons substantivalist ontology of time (or space).6
Let the solid line on the left in the diagram above be a portion of the world-line of a clock U1
6which is at rest at a point A of an inertial system I. And let E′ be an event belonging to the career
of another clock U2 at rest at a point B of I. Furthermore, suppose that any clock U which moves
in I and intersects the world-line of U1 has the same reading as the latter for the event of their
first encounter. It is then a fact that (after allowance for the effects of what Reichenbach has
called differential forces) U will have the same reading as U1 for any subsequent encounter
with it. This agreement between U and U1 is not, however, the sole respect in which Newtonian
and relativistic clock transport differ from one another.
In the Newtonian world of arbitrarily fast particles (or causal chains), the career S of U1
contains a unique event E which cannot also belong to the career of any moving clock U (or
other particle) containing with E′. Once the Newtonian time system is elaborated, this fact can be
expressed by the statement that the same body (U) cannot be at two different places (A and B) at
the same time. And the specified unique event E divides S into disjoint open subintervals of
events X and Y having the following properties: every event x in X and every event y in Y can also
belong to the world-line of a moving clock U whose intersection with the world-line of U2  is E′.
Furthermore, if each clock U was locally synchronized with U1, the time t′ of E′ on every U is the
same and is numerically between the time of x on U (or U1) and the time of y on U (or U1). The
world-lines of such clocks U are shown by dotted lines. And the betweenness of E′ on these
world-lines is a matter of purely ordinal temporal fact. For it does not depend on invoking any
durational measure of an event interval xE′ or E′y. Thus, for any x in X and any y in Y, E′ is
temporally between them on the basis of the identical reading t′ of suitably fast moving clocks U
whose respective careers likewise comprise x and y. And E′ is the only event on the world-line of
U2  sustaining these betweenness relations to all of the members of X and Y.
But it is also true (by our definition of X and Y) that E is the only event in S which is
temporally between every x in X and every y in Y. It follows that (i) E′ and E are temporally
between identically the same events in S, and (ii) in any system of quasi-serial temporal order
comprising the events on U2  and in S, E′ and E occupy the same place with respect to the order
of earlier and later as a matter of ordinal temporal fact. Hence on the basis of temporal
betweenness relations alone, E′ is uniquely simultaneous with E within S, and E is uniquely
simultaneous with E′ within the career of U2.
In order to characterize further the ontological status of the simultaneity furnished by
7Newtonian clock transport, it behooves us to comment on the bearing of causal relations in
Newtons theory on its time relations. Newtons third law of motion (law of action and equal,
opposite reaction), coupled with his law of universal gravitation, tells us that our E and E′ are
linkable by reciprocal instantaneous gravitational influences. These can be represented as causal
chains EE′E or E′EE′ whose emission at either E or E′ coincides with its return to either E or
E′. And since no Newtonian body can be at two different places simultaneously, no Newtonian
body or clock can link E to E′ so that these events coincide spatio-temporally with
event-members belonging to its career. Indeed, in Newtons world, gravitational influence chains
are the only causal chains whose careers can include simultaneous events such as E and E′. And
gravitational chains comprise none but simultaneous events. Moreover, any set of pairwise
non-simultaneous events can be linked by a non-gravitational causal chain which is genidentical,
i.e., which is constituted by the career of one and the same body. The career of a single standard
clock is, of course, an instance of merely one particular species of genidentical causal chain.
It would clearly be inconsistent with Newtons temporal order to demand, as is done in
the STR, the non-simultaneity of two events connectible only by the fastest causal chain rather
than by a single clock. For on Newtons theory, our events E and E′ are simultaneous according
to its clock readings, and yet they are connectible by Newtons fastest causal chain (gravitation)
and only by such a chain. By contrast, the STR requires its clocks to be set so as to issue in the
non-simultaneity of any two events which can belong only to the career of its fastest causal
chains (light), even though these events cannot both be on the world-line of a single clock.
It is clear from our analysis that in Newtons world events are simultaneous as a matter of
physical fact because of nonmetrical temporal relations furnished by that worlds clocks and/or
causal relations. Spatially separated Newtonian clocks at A and B can be consistently
synchronized by transporting a third clock U from A to B and making each of them locally
synchronous with U when it coincides with them. We see that the sameness of the time numbers
furnished for simultaneous events by such synchronized clocks A and B renders an equivalence
relation that exists between these events as a matter of physical fact. Thus the existence of the
relation to which the Newtonian theory applies the name simultaneous does not involve any
conventional ingredient. What is conventional here is the particular identity of the time number
assigned alike to all members of a class of simultaneous events. The identity of that number
8results from one arbitrary setting of one clock. But the equivalence relation of simultaneity
rendered by the same clock numbers is not predicated on a convention in Newtons theory.
Newtonian simultaneity is absolute in the standard physical sense that the simultaneity of
two events E and E′ is invariant with respect to all reference frames. But Newtons simultaneity
is also factual, as opposed to conventional, because it is vouchsafed by purely ordinal temporal
facts furnished by the clocks and/or causal relations in his world.
This then is the sense in which, I claim, the pertinent physical facts in Newtons world
mandate a unique and indeed absolute relation of simultaneity. It will behoove us to bear this
state of affairs in mind, by way of contrast to the STR, when we inquire to what extent the
relevant physical facts mandate a relation of relative simultaneity in the STR.
4. Howard Stein made a helpful distinction that I shall bring to bear on my appraisal
below of Friedmans critique of me, which Malament endorsed:7
There are really two distinct aspects to the issue of the conventionality
of Einsteins concept of relative simultaneity. One may assume the position of
Einstein himself at the outset of his investigation--that is, of one confronted by a
problem, trying to find a theory that will deal with it satisfactorily; or one may
assume the position of (for instance) Minkowski--that is, of one confronted with a
theory already developed, trying to find its most adequate and instructive
formulation. The issue in its latter aspect has been dealt with--in my opinion,
conclusively--by David Malament (1977), . . .
As to the procedure of Einstein, he of course had no space-time
geometry within which to propose a concept of simultaneity; on the contrary, the
task he had conceived was precisely that of constructing a suitable space-time
geometry--or equivalently, in Einsteins own terms, of devising a suitable new
kinematics.
As to Einsteins account of the ontological status of simultaneity relative to an inertial
frame, we need to turn first to Section 1, entitled Definition of Simultaneity, in his 1905
paper.8
There he uses the German word Festsetzung, which I translate by stipulation, when
he tells us of the need for a Festsetzung to make  temporal comparisons at spatially separated
9points. This Festsetzung comes into play, he says, when we endeavor to define a time that is
common to space points A and B. The latter time, he explains, can now be defined, indem
man durch Definition festsetzt, i.e., by stipulating by means of a definition, that the one-way
transit times of a reflected light ray in opposite directions of the path AB are equal.9 This is his
optical specification of the familiar standard synchrony of clocks. Thus, events at A and B that
are assigned equal time coordinates by this stipulation are metrically simultaneous on the
strength of it.
In 1954 (originally 1916), Einstein made it even more explicit that he contrasts a
stipulation with a supposition or a hypothesis such that there is no fact to the matter
whether two events are simultaneous relative to a particular inertial observer.10 There he
considers two points A and B at a railway embankment, and the line segment between them
whose mid-point is M. An observer at M can observe the joint arrival at M of light flashes
originating at A and B, respectively. As to whether the two flashes originated simultaneously on
the embankment, Einstein writes:11  . . .That light requires the same time to traverse the path
A→M as for the path B→M is in reality neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the physical
nature of light, but a stipulation which I can make of my own freewill in order to arrive at a
definition of simultaneity.
5. We shall now see that the facts of causal connectibility and non-connectibility in the
STR--hereafter light cone causalitydo not mandate Malaments constraint (i): These facts
provide scope for the causal definability of a family of infinitely many non-standard equivalence
relations of simultaneity with respect to one and the same inertial observer O. As we recall,
Malament was able to rule out these non-standard simultaneity relations in favor of the standard
relation Sim0 by imposing his constraint (i) in addition to his other three. As we recall, his
constraint (i) is that the relation S of simultaneity relative to O be invariant under all causal
automorphisms that map Os world line onto itself (O causal automorphisms).
But a reformulation of a construction that Allen Janis gave in 198312 enables us to see
that this constraint is not mandated either by light cone causality or by Ss being an equivalence
relation of simultaneity relation relative to O. Let me quote from Janiss reformulation (private
communication, December 15, 2000, italics added):
As Malament shows (p. 296), standard simultaneity specifies that the events
10
simultaneous with a given event on Os world line are those events lying in the
hyperplane orthogonal to Os world line and containing the given event. Suppose
O were to make a different [non-standard] choice of simultaneity, as follows: By
specifying a set of three parameters, O can uniquely designate a time-like line that
is inclined to Os world line, intersecting it at a given event E. This line could be
interpreted as the world line of an observer, say A, moving with respect to O (and
the components of As velocity relative to O could serve as the aforementioned
three parameters), but it should be emphasized that this construction is to be
thought of as something carried out entirely by O: As world line is to be
described from the point of view of Os inertial frame. O then specifies that the
events simultaneous with the event E on Os world line are those events lying in
the hyperplane orthogonal to As world line and containing E. (Since a hyperplane
orthogonal to a time-line is necessarily space-like, Os specification is necessarily
consistent with [light cone] causality.) If we then define A causal
automorphisms as those causal automorphisms that take As world line into
itself, and replace O causal automorphisms by A causal automorphisms
everywhere in the statement and proof of Malaments uniqueness theorem, the
proof would go through just as before [i.e., for any one choice of a particular time-
like world line A, a particular non-standard simultaneity relation would be
uniquely defined].
In short, events that are standardly simultaneous in As rest frame are now non-standardly
simultaneous in Os rest frame. But there are an infinitude of time-like world lines A, each one
specified by a set of three parameters, and each one generating a particular non-standard
simultaneity relative to O. And since the use of the three parameters is entirely compatible with
light cone causality, no one simultaneity relation relative to O is the only one definable from κ
and O, although standard simultaneity is the only one definable from κ and O alone, as shown by
Malament.
In this important sense, assertion (i) in Malaments opening paragraph is true after all,
rather than false, as he would have it.
Yet as Janis (1983) and van Fraassen have noted, the descriptive simplicity of standard
11
simultaneity is manifested anew by the fact that Malaments constraint (i) dispenses with Janiss
three parameters. Thus, as van Fraassen put it, this constraint enables Malament to define
standard relative simultaneity from κ and O alone. Yet constraint (i), not being mandated by light
cone causality, issues no less in a conventional choice of simultaneity Sim0 than do the
constructions via the world lines A, which issue in non-standard relations of simultaneity. I
therefore conclude that Malaments remarkable proof has not undermined my thesis that, in the
STR, relative simultaneity is conventional, as contrasted with its non-conventionality in the
Newtonian world, which I have articulated. Thus, I do not need to retract the actual claim I made
in 1963 as follows:13 Unlike the Newtonian situation, . . .the physical facts postulated by
[special] relativity require the introduction, within a single inertial frame S, of a convention
stipulating which particular pair of topologically simultaneous [i.e., space-like separated] events.
. .will be chosen to be metrically simultaneous.
6. Now let me respond to Malaments endorsement of Michael Friedmans views, which I
had occasion to cite preliminarily at the end of Section 1.
First, I am quite surprised that both of them see no reason why [in the STR] we must
adopt a causal theory of time or, for that matter, any reductionist analysis of temporal relations.
In my view, there are indeed good reasons, and they seem to be persuasive:
(i) In the STR, the entire system of invariant temporal relations among events is based
ontologically on causal relations by being coextensive with them: (a) As we saw in Section 2,
events in the theory sustain invariant relations of time-separation if and only if they are
causally connectible respectively by the career of a particle of non-zero rest-mass or by the
motion of a photon; (b) other events sustain invariant relations of space-like separation, if and
only if they are not thus causally connectible. Thus, Malament wrote (1977, p. 294): Two point
events are said to be causally connectible if and only if it is possible for a photon or particle with
non-zero rest-mass to travel between them (in either direction). Furthermore, relations of
metrical simultaneity relative to inertial frames--whose ontological status I just characterized in
Section 5 and shall consider further below--are confined in the STR to events having a causally
grounded space-like separation.
(ii) The recognition that, in the STR, the whole system of invariant temporal relations is
ontologically coextensive with the specified causal relations provides a clear framework for
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Einsteins construction of the new kinematics by which he replaced the Newtonian one. And
hence I consider it justified to determine the ontological status of metrical simultaneity relative to
an inertial frame within the context of a causal theory of time.
By contrast, Friedmans point of view provides no ontological why and wherefore for the
space-time structure of Minkowski space-time, nor of the ontological rationale for its superiority
to its Newtonian predecessor. Instead of giving a justifiable ontological underpinning to the
superseding theory as against its predecessor, Friedman is content with a statement that they
differ geometrically (Friedman 1977, pp. 404405):
. . .I shall treat both Newtonian mechanics and special relativity as space-time
theories. I view both theories as theories about a four-dimensional manifold,
space-time, and the geometrical structures that characterize it. Where the two
theories differ is with respect to the geometrical structures that space-time actually
possesses. In particular, differences between the two theories as to time and
simultaneity are to be understood as differences in the geometrical properties
predicated of space-time. I adopt this view of the two theories because it seems to
me to make their similarities and differences--their comparison--especially clear.
To this, he adds (Friedman 1977, p. 410), again without any why and wherefore:
Our world is a Minkowski space-time, not a Newtonian space-time; and neither a
frame-independent global time nor a frame-independent simultaneity relation
exists.
Hence next let me inquire into the fundamentum in re, if any, of the simultaneity of two
events relative to an inertial frame. Malament notes approvingly (1977, p. 293) that, according to
Friedman, I had failed to establish that there is no fact to the matter whether two events are
simultaneous relative to a particular inertial observer. Yet I have now done so in Section 5. And
in my citations from Einsteins writings of 1905 and 1954 in Section 2 above, he had explicitly
asserted just such non-facticity for frame-dependent simultaneity. As will be recalled, he wrote
(see Note 10):   . . .That light requires the same time to traverse the path A→M as for the path
B→M is in reality neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the physical nature of light, but a
stipulation which I can make of my own freewill in order to arrive at a definition of
simultaneity. To reach that conclusion, Einstein was clearly looking at how he constructed the
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new kinematics of his STR; he was not taking its finished geometrical formulation at face value
as a basis for articulating its underlying space-time ontology. And the standard simultaneity he
stipulated by his light signal method is, of course, Malaments Sim0.
One lesson I derived from Einsteins historic case was to reject as uncritical the attempt
to read off the ontology of a space-time theory from its geometrical formulation, when taken at
face value; this attempt, I claim, begs the question with respect to such noteworthy stipulative
(conventional) ingredients as the theory may contain. Referring to my view, John Winnie14 wrote
concurringly:
One moral of this view is clear, and well worth heeding. The standard
formulations and practices surrounding a physical theory do not provide clear and
explicit guides to its ontological claims. At best, they furnish preliminary clues to
be used by the critical scientific realist in his efforts to create a reconstructed
version of the theory that will exhibit its physical commitments with greater
perspicuity.
Alas, Friedmans procedure is just the opposite. How, I ask, does he determine whether
assertions of relative simultaneity in the STR have a fundamentum in re (ontological referent)?
He peremptorily assumes a substantivalist interpretation of the entire geometrical structure of
Minkowski space-time. But, as I explained above, I have positive reasons for espousing a causal
theory of time in the STR. And, as I have argued, that causal theory provides a clear rationale for
Einsteins explicit assertion that there is no fact to the matter in ascriptions of frame-dependent
metrical simultaneity in the STR, Malaments formal result notwithstanding. How can Friedman
explain that Einstein used light propagation in keeping with the causal theory of time to provide
an avowedly stipulative enunciation of frame-dependent simultaneity relations? Einstein made
this stipulation before deriving the Lorentz transformations which contain it and to which
Friedman nonetheless gives a uniformly substantivalist interpretation. Thus, Friedman did not
join the issue with me when he wrote (1977, p. 430):
Grünbaums argument, unlike Reichenbachs, has the advantage that if it
were correct, we could draw semantic conclusions about the truth-value of
sentences containing simultaneous on the basis of the referential properties of
their key terms. For, if Grünbaums argument is correct, it follows that
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simultaneous has no referent--there is no objective physical relation for it to
refer to. And this would make the conventionalist contention that sentences like
Events e1 and e2 are simultaneous with respect to state of inertial motion M 
lack determinate truth-value highly plausible. However, it seems to me that
Grünbaums actual argument is much less persuasive than Reichenbachs.
Reichenbach has given some plausibility to the claim that statements about distant
simultaneity may be unverifiable within the context of special relativity. As far as
I can see, Grünbaum has given us no reason to accept the view that the only
objective temporal relations are constituted by causal relations. Indeed, how could
one possibly support such a view? Our only grip on which properties and relations
are objective constituents of the physical world is via our best theories of the
physical world. The properties and relations that we hold to exist objectively are
those that our best physical theories postulate. And since our best theories do not
merely postulate the kind of ordinal (causal) temporal relations favored by
Grünbaum--they postulate metrical relations as well--we have no reason to grant
such ordinal (causal) relations the privileged ontological status that Grünbaum
wants to ascribe to them.
But, as we saw, Einstein stated emphatically that assertions of metrical simultaneity in the STR
are not hypotheses which are postulated in Friedmans sense, ontologically on a par with,
say, the postulate that light is the fastest causal chain. Why then does Friedman feel entitled to
gloss over that important ontological difference by using the same term postulate for both? By
the same token, he does not tell us what he makes of the following 1949 ontological declaration
of Einsteins:15
We now shall inquire into the insights of definite nature which physics
owes to the special theory of relativity.
(1) There is no such thing as simultaneity of distant events;
Indeed, if Friedmans claims, and Malaments endorsement of them, were sound, they
would impugn not only my views but also Einsteins conventionalist conception of the
ontological status of frame-dependent simultaneity. After all, if Malament had succeeded in
showing that his standard simultaneity relation Sim0 is non-conventional, he would have
15
succeeded in proving Einstein and Reichenbach wrong, no less than me. I am therefore greatly
puzzled that neither Malament nor Friedman said a word about the derogatory bearing of their
critique of me on Einsteins pioneering conception.
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